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THE FSA TRIBUNAL IN ACTION
The Financial Services and Markets Tribunal Rules
2001
These rules, which were laid before Parliament on 10July 2001(see SI 2001 No 2476) and came intoforce on 3 September 2001 (see SI 2001 No 2632),
have been developed in five Parts:
Part I Introduction
Part II Preliminary Matters
Part III Hearings
Part IV Appeals from the Tribunal; and
Part V General
Part I is predominantly concerned with the definitions
of certain chosen terms. These rules apply to all references
to the Tribunal. Under “Preliminary Matters” (Part I)
come the following: Reference notice (like a claim);
Authority’s statement of case; Applicant’s reply; Secondary
disclosure of the authority; Exceptions to disclosure;
Directions, particular types of discretions; Filing of
subsequent notices in relation to the referred action;
Summoning of witnesses; Preliminary hearing; Withdrawal
of reference and unopposed references; and References by
third parties.
A reference is to be made by way of a written notice
signed by or on behalf of the applicant. A reference notice
shall state the name and address of the applicant, and of the
representative; if any; and the issues that the applicant
would like the Tribunal to consider.
Secondary disclosure by the Financial Services Authority
may be necessary because of the information revealed in
the applicant’s reply. Disclosure of documents may be
dispensed with when a document relates to a case involving
a person other than the applicant which has already been
taken into account by the Authority for the purposes of
comparison with other cases; or when disclosure is
prohibited by section 17 of the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000. A party may seek dispensation for
disclosure from the Tribunal on the grounds that disclosure
of the document would not be in the public interest or that
it would not be fair to disclose a document having regard
to:
“(i)the likely significance of the document to the applicant in
relation to the matter referred to the Tribunal; and
(ii) the potential prejudice to the commercial interests of a
person other than the applicant which would be caused by
disclosure of the document.”
The Tribunal has the power to require a party seeking
exceptions to disclosure to submit reasoned arguments in
support of its applicant, and to invite the other party to
make representations and decide on this matter. The
Tribunal may at any time give directions in order to enable
the parties to prepare for the hearing of the reference, and
to assist it to determine the issues and “to ensure the just,
expeditious and economical determination of the
reference” (r 9(1)). The Tribunal may give directions on
the application of any party or of all the parties or of its
own initiative; but where it gives a direction of its own
initiative, it may, but need not give, prior notice to the
parties of its intention to do so (r 9(2)).
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The dispute procedure under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the “Act”)
may be found under Part IX (Hearing and Appeals) and Part XVI (The Ombudsman
Scheme). The Act has devised a novel system whereby disputes pertaining to matters
under the purview of the Act will be settled either through the Ombudsman Scheme or
through Part IX procedure under which Part the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal
(the “Tribunal”) has been set up. The second part of this two-part article considers the
Tribunal mechanism.
The chairman of the Tribunal has total discretion to
decide whether a pre-hearing review would be appropriate
in regard to a reference. Such reviews take place before the
chairman.
The rules make a difference between a “pre-hearing
review” and a “preliminary hearing”. Whereas at a
“preliminary hearing review” the chairman gives directions
which would appear to be necessary or desirable for
securing the just, expeditious and economical conduct of
the reference, and endeavours to secure that “the parties
make all admissions and agreements as they ought
reasonably to have made in relation to the proceedings” (r
9(11) (a) & (b)), the purpose of holding a preliminary
hearing is to determine the question of fact or law, if
necessary. A preliminary hearing procedure serves another
purpose, which is clearly stated in paragraph 2 of rule 13:
“If, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the determination of that
question substantially disposes of the reference, the Tribunal
may treat the preliminary hearing as the hearing of the
reference and may make such order by way of disposing of the
reference as it thinks fit.”
An applicant may withdraw the reference at any time
before the hearing of it, without permission, by filing a
notice to that effect or at the hearing of the reference, with
the permission of the Tribunal. In certain circumstances a
reference may be determined without an oral hearing (see
r 16(1)); but except for the following circumstances, in
which hearing shall take place in private, all hearings shall
be in public:
• upon the application of all the parties; or
• if the Tribunal, upon the application of a party, is
satisfied that a hearing ought to be held in private,
having regard to:
“(i)the interests of morals, public order, national security or
the protection of the private lives of the parties; or
(ii) any unfairness to the applicant or prejudice to the
interests of consumers that might result from a hearing in
public,
if, in either case, the Tribunal is satisfied that a hearing in
private would not prejudice the interests of justice” (see r
17(2) & (3)).”
Generally, parties themselves may appear at a hearing,
with assistance from any person, if desired, or may be
represented by any person, whether qualified in law or not.
The parties are usually entitled to give evidence, including
expert evidence (the latter, with the consent of the
Tribunal), to call witnesses, to question any witness, and to
address the Tribunal on the evidence, and subject matter of
the reference. It is interesting to point out that evidence
may be admitted by the Tribunal irrespective of whether it
would be deemed admissible by a court of law, and whether
not it was available to the Financial Services Authority
when taking the referred action (r 19(3)).
A discussion of the Tribunal may be reviewed if, either
on the application of a party or of its own initiative, the
Tribunal is satisfied that:
• its decision on a reference was incorrectly made as a
result of an error made by its staff; or
• since the conclusion of the hearing new evidence has
become available, the existence of which could not have
been reasonably known or foreseen (r 22(1)).
Where a review is allowed, the original decision of the
Tribunal is set aside. An application for a review must be
made within 14 days after the date on which the
notification of the decision was sent to the parties. Where
the Tribunal proposes to review its decision on its own
initiative, the parties concerned are notified of it no later
than 14 days after the date on which the decision was sent
to the parties.
“Reviews” are different from “appeals”. An “appeal”
may be made under section 137(1) to the Court of Appeal
or to the Court of Session in the case of Scotland on a
decision of the Tribunal disposing of a reference.
Permission to appeal may be sought by making an
application, oral or written. Whereas an oral application
may be made at the hearing after the decision is announced
by the Tribunal, a written application must be filed stating
the grounds therein no later than 14 days after the decision
is sent to the party making the application (r 23(2)(b)).
The chairman of the Tribunal takes the decision as to
permission to appeal. In the event of the Tribunal refusing
an application for appeal, it shall issue a direction whereby
an appellant, if he so wishes, may seek permission from the
Court of Appeal or the Court of Session, within 14 days of
the refusal of application by the Tribunal.
The Court of Appeal or the Court of Session, as the case
may be, has the power to remit a reference to the Tribunal
under section 137(3)(a) of the Financial Services and
Markets Act, 2000 for a re-hearing and determination. The
Financial Services and Markets Tribunals Rules 2001, so
far as relevant, apply to re-hearings too. When a party may
fail to comply, without reasonable excuse, with a direction
given by the Tribunal under these rules or with any of its
provisions, the Tribunal may take any one or more of the
following steps:
• make an order for costs;
• where that party is the applicant, dismiss the whole or
part of the reference; and
• where the party is the Financial Services Authority,
strike out the whole or part of the statement of case,
and “… where appropriate, direct the Authority be
debarred from contesting the reference altogether (r
27(1)). ” 23
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EUROLIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY AND FSA:
THE TRIBUNAL’S REASONING
Since its inception, the Financial Services and Markets
Tribunal has decided a few cases; it is opportune to discuss
one case to examine how the provisions of the 2000 Act
and the Rules of Procedure were applied, in addition to
applying other provisions of the relevant statutes. The
parties to this case were Eurolife Assurance Company Ltd
(Applicant) and Financial Services Authority (Respondent). (The
report of this case is available from
http://www.courtservice.gov.uk/tribunals/comtax/decision/
eurolife2.htm)).
The applicant (EAC) is a member of the Eurolife Group
and has Eurolife Assurance Group plc (EAG) as its holding
company. EAC is a UK life assurance company which
specialises in single premium bond products; these
products are distributed through independent financial
advisors (“IFAS”). The material report at the relevant time
from EAC was that related to March 2002. This report
showed that EAC at that time held sufficient capital to
cover its required solvency margin but that the assets which
EAC had in its long-term business fund were less than its
liabilities.
On 20 August 2001, the FSA notified EAC of its
intention to make requirements under sections 39 and 40
of the Insurance Companies Act 1982 whereby EAC
should have maintained assets to the value of its liabilities
within the European Community, and the entire assets
should be held by a trustee approved by FSA, in order to
protect the interests of EAC’s policyholders by putting
assets in a trust which would not be controlled by EAC.
On 24 August 2001 the Financial Services Authority
served on EAC a notice under section 12A of the Insurance
Companies Act 1982 directing it ceased to be authorised to
effect contracts of insurance as it failed to fulfil the criteria
of sound and prudent management required by the 1982
Act. This notice was based on an investigation carried out
by FSA into the company.
EAC objected to the procedure under the 1982 Act;
furthermore, there was no provision for a review of the
merits of the FSA’s decision before an independent and
impartial tribunal. It was agreed that the FSA’s notice
under the 1982 Act would remain in place until the new
regulatory regime for insurance companies under the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 came into force
on 1 December 2001.
On 29 November 2001, FSA issued a supervisory notice
pursuant to section 53(4) of the Financial Services and
Markets Act 2000, the effect of which was withdrawal of
EAC’s authorisation to conduct new insurance business as
of 1 December 2001. It was also required to have sufficient
assets to meet EAC’s liabilities within the European
Community, which assets were to be held by an approved
trustee.
In accordance with section 55 of the Financial Services
and Markets Act, on 21 December 2000 EAC referred this
matter to this Tribunal, and requested the Tribunal, inter
alia, to hold the hearing in private in accordance with rule
17(3) of the rules of the Tribunal. (It is not considered to
be necessary to refer to the activities of other companies in
that Eurofile Group, namely EAG (Eurofile Assurance
Group plc) and EFM (Eurofile Fund Management Ltd) in
the context of this discussion).
The principal legal issues to be decided by the Tribunal
were whether EAC’s request for holding the entire hearing
in private in order not to cause any possible prejudice to its
customers and to give direction accordingly was justifiable
under rule 17(3) of the Financial Services and Markets
Tribunal Rules 2001. Rule 17 provides, inter alia, that:
“(2) Subject to the following paragraphs of this rule, all
hearings shall be in public.
(3) The Tribunal may direct that all or part of a hearing
shall be in private …
(b) upon the application of any party, if the Tribunal is
satisfied that a hearing in private is necessary, having
regard to –
(i) the interests of morals, public order, national security or
the protection of the private lives of the parties; or
(ii) any unfairness to the applicant or prejudice to the
interests of consumers that might result from a hearing
in public,
if, in either case, the Tribunal is satisfied that a hearing in
private would not prejudice the interests of justice …”
“(5) Before giving a direction under paragraph (3) that the
entire hearing should be in private, the Tribunal shall
consider whether only part of the hearing should be
heard in private …”
“(11)Where all or part of a hearing is held or is to be held
in private, the Tribunal may direct that information
about the whole or part of the proceedings before the
Tribunal (including information that might help to
identify any person) shall not be made public, and
such a direction may provide for the information (if
any) that is to be entered in the register or removed
from it.”
The Tribunal’s determination was against EAC’s
application for the hearing to be in private and declined to
make a direction accordingly. The reasoning of the Tribunal
was developed under three headings: (a) observations on
the relevant law; (b) the unfairness or prejudice condition;
and (c) the interests of justice condition. Although the
Tribunal considered this last heading, it did not find it
necessary to address it in its determination. The Tribunal’s
reasoning is discussed below.24
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Observations on the relevant law
The Tribunal traced the history of rule 17. The debate
of the House of Lords on whether hearings before the FSA
Tribunal should entirely or in part be held in public or in
private may be found in the Lords Official Report (Report
dated 23 October 2001, vol 627, No. 31, Columns 922-
942). The general view of the House of Lords was that
hearings before the FSA Tribunal should be held in public.
Baroness Scotland of Asthal described the terms of rule
17(3) as a very flexible tool. She stated, inter alia, that rule
17:
“… enables the [Tribunal] to exercise its judicial judgment,
first, as to whether the … matter should be heard in private,
and secondly, which part of the hearing should be heard in
private and how disclosure should be managed.”
An application under rule 17(3) is likely to be
accompanied or followed up by further application under
rule 17(11). Both rule 17(3) and rule 17(11) allow the
Tribunal a considerable margin of power in considering
whether a hearing should in its entirety or in part be held
in public or in private. There does not exist a difference
between “keeping proceedings secret”, and “holding a
hearing in private”, and this issue was clarified by the Court
of Appeal in Hodgson v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [1998] 1 WLR
1056. Proceedings in chambers are not confidential, and
“information about what had occurred should be made
available to the public”, except in certain exceptional
circumstances, which, unless governed by any statute such
as the Administration of Justice Act 1960 (s 12(1)) may be
identified by the court in the light of the special nature of
a proceedings. Lord Woolf MR stated, inter alia, at 1070
that:
“A distinction has to be clearly drawn between the normal
situation where a court sits in chambers and when a court sits
in camera in the exceptional situation recognised in Scott v
Scott [1913] AC 417 or the court sits in chambers and the
case falls in the categories specified in section 12(1) of the
Act of 1960 (which include issues involving children,
national security, secret processes and the like).”…
…“Proceedings in chambers however are always correctly
described as being conducted in private. The word “chambers”
is used because of its association with the judge’s room so as
to distinguish a hearing in chambers from a hearing in open
court. While the public in general are normally free to come
into and go from a court (as long as there is capacity for
them to do so) during most hearings the same is not true of
chambers hearings. Other than the parties and their
representatives the public need the permission of the judge to
attend.”
In Scott v Scott, Viscount Haldane LC provided (at 439) a
powerful argument against court hearings in private:
“A mere desire to consider feelings of delicacy or to exclude
from publicity details while it would be desirable not to
publish is not … enough as the law now stands. I think that
to justify an order for hearing in camera it must be shown
that the paramount object of securing justice is done would
really be rendered doubtful of attainment if the order was not
made.”
In this case, the application was made under rule
17(3)(b)(ii), according to which to justify an order for a
hearing in private, the Tribunal must be satisfied that: (a)
such a hearing is necessary having regard to any unfairness
to the applicant or that a hearing in public might be
prejudicial to the interests of consumers; and (b) that a
hearing in private is in the interests of justice. The Tribunal
dealt with this issue under two sub-headings: “unfairness
or prejudicial conditions” and the “interests of justice
conditions”.
The Tribunal pointed out that the phraseology of rule
17(3)(a) is taken from Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. In Hakansson v Sweden
(1991) 13 EHRR 1, at para 66, the European Court of
Human Rights established that a waiver from a public
hearing might only be made where it would not run
counter to the public interest. According to the Tribunal,
English law was in line with the Strasbourg jurisprudence
in terms of the “interests of justice condition”, but not so
in relation to the unfairness or prejudicial condition.
Publicity is the very soul of justice. In Scott v Scott, Lord
Shaw of Dunfermline relied on Bentham:
“In the darkness of secrecy, similar interest and evil in every
shape have full swing. Only in proportion as publicity has
place can any of the checks applicable to judicial injustice
operate. Where there is no publicity there is no justice.”
His Lordship went on to state (at 484) that:
“To extend the powers of a judge so as to restrain or forbid a
narrative of the proceedings either by speech or by writing
seems to me to be an unwarrantable stretch of judicial
authority.”
A similar view of jurisprudence was also advocated by
the European Court of Human Rights in Biennet v Frazee
[1979] AC 440. But, support for the contrary principle
was expressed in both Scott v Scott and A-G and Leveller
Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440. In the former case, Earl
Loreburn stated, inter alia, (at 446) that:
“… in all cases where the public has been excluded with
admitted propriety the underlying principle, as it seems to me,
is that the administration of justice would be rendered
impracticable by their presence, whether because the case could
not be effectively tried, or the parties entitled to justice would
be reasonably deterred from seeking it at the hands of the
court.”
The courts have inherent jurisdiction on this matter.
Such a view was reinforced by Viscount Dilhorne in A-G v
Leveller Magazine when he stated that:
“Proceedings in the courts of his country are normally
conducted in public. The courts have, however, inherent 25
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jurisdiction to sit in camera if that is necessary for the due
administration of justice.”
The Tribunal maintained that if the unfairness or
prejudice condition is satisfied, then the interests of justice
condition will also be satisfied. But the Tribunal also
pointed out (at para 43 of the case report) that:
“If the unfairness or prejudice condition is fulfilled, the
interests of justice in the particular case are likely to be better
served by the holding of the hearing in private. Nevertheless,
the Tribunal must keep in mind the important public interest
in open justice, which goes beyond the considerations arising
from the circumstances of the particular case under review,
and before making a rule 17 direction the Tribunal must in
every case be satisfied also that the interest of justice in this
more general sense will not be prejudiced.”
The unfairness or prejudice condition
Rule 17 of the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal
Rules allows the Tribunal to exercise its discretion (by
using the word “may”) as to whether a hearing should be
held in private in the interests of morals, public order,
national security or to avoid unfairness to the applicant or
prejudice to the interests of consumers, which might result
from a hearing in public. One of the legal issues that the
Tribunal was required to consider was whether
“unfairness” is difference from “prejudices”, and whether
“reputational risk” may give rise to unfairness. The FSA’s
representatives argued that reputational risk was to be
regarded as constituting unfairness, and that most cases
would be held in private, which would be contrary to the
plain intention of the rule (para 32 of the report).
According to the FSA representatives: “The existence of
unfairness is not sufficient on its own to predetermine the
Tribunal’s exercise of its discretion.”
The Tribunal pointed out that the applicant in this case
relied on unfairness to associated companies as well as to
the applicant itself. The question remains, prejudice to
whom, presumably to consumers. But the Act of 2000
widely defined the term “consumer” in section 5(3) and
138 and rule 17, in particular, any consumer may be
relevant for the purposes of rule 17(3). Secondly, it is
necessary to provide concrete and cogent evidence to
establish “prejudice”. No ritualistic assertion is enough
(see In re An Inquiry under the Company Securities (Insider
Dealing) Act 1985 [1988] AC 660 at 709, per Lord Oliver
of Aylelmerton). However, in Regina v Legal Aid Board ex
parte Kaim Todner [1999] QB 966, two solicitors against
whom allegations of dishonesty were brought in
connection with a legal aid franchise sought anonymity in
proceedings. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal,
and held that:
“… any interference with the public nature of court
proceedings was to be avoided unless justice required it, and
where no specific statutory exception applied protection
against identification of a party should therefore be granted
only where it was necessary for the proper administration of
justice; that there was no justification for singling out the
legal profession for special treatment when considering whether
to grant anonymity to a party to legal proceedings; that in
determining an application for anonymity it was appropriate
to take into account the extent of the restriction on disclosure
sought, the nature of the proceedings, the identity of the party
seeking the order and the reasonableness of the claim; that a
person who initiated proceedings could reasonably be
considered to have accepted the normal incidence of the public
nature of court proceedings and, in general, parties had to
accept the embarrassment, damage to reputation and possible
consequential loss which could be inherent in being involved
in litigation, the protection to which they were entitled
normally being provided by a judgment delivered in public
refuting unfounded allegations; that a party could not be
allowed to achieve anonymity by insisting upon it as a
condition for being involved in proceedings irrespective of an
order for anonymity depended on the individual circumstances
and, provided a judge adopted the correct approach, the Court
of Appeal would not interfere with his decision; and that in
all the circumstances the judge had been right to refuse the
application for anonymity.”
The criteria for anonymity in proceedings were settled
in this case. The idea of holding proceedings in private is
also to maintain anonymity from the general public. Thus,
the criteria for anonymity in proceedings may also be
applied to private proceedings.
EAC maintained that unfairness to itself from the
hearing being held in public might arise in at least two
ways: (a) that a public hearing would cause irreparable
damage to EAC’s reputation; and (b) that the
consequential damage to EAC’s business would be so
disproportionate as to be unfair.
The Tribunal pointed out that the risk of damage to
reputation would not of itself normally be unfair. Without
going into the minute details of the arguments put forward
by EAC, it may be stated that the Tribunal observed that
the evidence of unfairness to EAC did not satisfy it that a
private hearing would be necessary or would be
appropriate. Despite the relevant arguments put forward
by the applicant in relation to prejudice against consumers
(see paras 51–4 of the case report), the Tribunal held that
the prejudice against the consumer was not such as to
make it necessary for the hearing to be in private.
This Tribunal was also seized to consider another issue –
when EAC purported to “withdraw its reference” to the
Tribunal without the latter’s permission. The facts of the
reference have already been detailed. On 24 December
2001 EAC referred the action to the FSA Tribunal in
accordance with section 55 of the Financial Services and
Markets Act, 2000. The reference was “listed” for a full
oral hearing in public on 2 September 2002. Before the
hearing took place, the parties asked for time in an attempt
to reach an agreement on certain matters, to which the26
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Tribunal agreed. The parties failed to reach any agreement
on that issue, but asked for further time to which the
Tribunal further agreed. On 4 September 2002 – before
the FSA had started to open their case – the representatives
for EAC submitted a letter of withdrawal in open court the
contents of which were:
“Following an agreement reached today between the parties to
the proceedings described above, we are writing … on behalf
of [EAC] to withdraw the Notice dated 24 December 2001
by which EAC referred the FSA’s First Supervisory Notice to
the Tribunal pursuant to section 133 of the FS&MA (See the
report on this case on the Court Service website
http://www.courtservice.gov.uk/tribunals/comtax/decision/
eurofile2.htm)”.
Rule 14 of the Financial Services and Markets Tribunals
Rules 2001 deals with the issue of withdrawal and
unopposed references. Paragraph (1) of this rule provides
that:
“(1) The applicant may withdraw the reference –
(a) at any time before the hearing of the reference, without
permission, by filing a notice to that effect; or
(b) at the hearing of the reference, with the Tribunal’s
permission,
and the Tribunal may determine any reference that is so
withdrawn.”
The provision does signify that withdrawal of references
rather than litigated decisions on references is preferred by
the Tribunal. However, under section 133(4) of the
Financial Services & Markets Act 2000, the Tribunal has a
statutory obligation to determine the nature of action it is
supposed to take on a reference. But, in the event of the
reference being withdrawn before the hearing took place,
which happened in this case, by reason of rule 14(1), the
Tribunal’s permission was not necessary. Thus, the
Tribunal found that the application for withdrawal was
valid.
Incidentally, in this case, the Tribunal rightly pointed out
that neither the Financial Services and Markets Act nor the
rules pertaining to it states when “the hearing of the
reference” begins. Two possibilities seem to have
developed: one that suggests that the hearing may be said
to have started when the time on the listing notice arrives,
or the other that it starts when the parties come into court
to ask for further time, as happened in this case. According
to the Tribunal, the hearing would effectively start with the
FSA’s opening. This phase of the case thus clarified at least
one legal issue, namely, when a “hearing” under the
Financial Services and Markets Rules, begins.
CONCLUSIONS
The dispute settlement procedures under the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000 entail two forms: the
Ombudsman Scheme and the Tribunal Scheme. The
Compulsory Ombudsman Scheme aims at a speedy and
informal resolution of disputes between members of the
public and an authorised person; the voluntary scheme
provides for adjudication of certain other disputes on a
voluntary basis. Neither form of the Ombudsman Scheme
is concerned with complaints against or by the FSA. The
Tribunal Scheme, on the other hand, establishes the
procedures for referring cases to it where the FSA has
decided to take regulatory action against an authorised
person or any person who may be allegedly in breach of a
provision of the Act.
The primary difference between the two schemes is that
whereas the Ombudsman Scheme allows the members of
the public to challenge the FSA in appropriate cases, the
second scheme allows the FSA to challenge the activities of
authorised persons. Thus, the conduct of both the FSA and
the authorised persons will be regulated, and will always be
under scrutiny, in consequence of which investors will be
in a better position. While the Ombudsman Scheme is the
body through which members of the public make
complaints against the FSA, the Tribunal is the authority to
which the FSA will lodge legal complaints about an
authorised person’s conduct, or a person who has authority
otherwise, or a player on the financial services markets.
The Ombudsman Scheme can deal with both legal and
non-legal issues, but the Tribunal will be dealing almost
exclusively with legal issues.
Voluntary jurisdiction under the Ombudsman Scheme
seems to be a novel idea in that it allows players or
authorised persons to ascertain their legal position in
respect of any conduct or performance about which they
may have doubts. The scheme must be appreciated in that
it is to be treated as a direct attempt by players and markets
to keep the markets in order. The voluntary jurisdiction
also confirms the fact that it is not by legal rules alone that
markets can be kept regulated. It should develop a degree
of awareness on the part of the players that they cannot do
anything which will disturb the market. In fact, a
recipient’s conduct on the part of each player will promote
their business also, and eventually confidence in the capital
market.
The inclusion of laymen in the panel of the Tribunal is a
laudable idea in that a dilution of legal and non-legal ideas
and experience would be extremely helpful in dealing with
disputes. The panel membership seems to be
comprehensive in that it will accept members from the
Northern Ireland and Scottish jurisdictions in addition to
the English jurisdiction.
Dispute settlement schemes under the Act of 2000 are
extremely extensive. It would be premature to comment
on their effectiveness as the rules have yet to be developed
to operate them and no cases have yet been reported on
the actual performance of any of the schemes. It should be
pointed out however that both the schemes require
resources, human and financial, in order to make them a 27
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success. The Financial Services and Markets Tribunal hears
references arising from decision notices issued by the FSA
on a wide range of regulatory and disciplinary matters,
namely: authorisations and permissions; disciplinary
measures; market abuse and official listing. A reference
may be made to this Tribunal on a matter which the Act so
provides.
Although the Tribunal does not charge any fee for
dealing with cases referred to it, parties are required to
bear the expenses of their legal representatives if they
decide to appoint them to conduct their cases. Although as
a general rule, public funding is not available for references
to the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal, this
principle does not apply to matters relating to market
abuse which are referred to under section 127(4) of the
Financial Services and Markets Act; a special scheme of
legal assistance has been established to provide financial
assistance to such cases.
A reference notice must be sent by an applicant or his
authorised representative for a case to be initiated. A
reference must normally be made within 28 days of the
decision notice. Upon receipt of a reference, the Tribunal
notifies the FSA of it, and the latter is then required to
lodge with the Tribunal a “statement of case” in support of
its position. In certain cases the Tribunal may take the view
that a pre-hearing revised should be arranged in order to
identify the issues in dispute and to resolve the dispute;
thus, a reference may be withdrawn at any time before the
hearing.
It is possible for an applicant to represent himself/itself
or by a person, whether legally qualified or not. If a dispute
is not settled or withdrawn on a consensual basis, it
proceeds to the hearing stage, but a withdrawal is possible
even after a hearing has commenced. The Tribunal has
discretion as to whether a hearing should take place in
public or private, bearing in mind that a hearing shall take
place in private if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so
in the interests of moral, public order, national security, the
protection of private lives of the parties – in addition to
having regard to any unfairness to the applicant or
prejudice to the interests of consumers that might result by
virtue of holding a public hearing.
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